Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. Casper Michael Dunkel III : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellee.
John T. Caine; Richards, Caine and Allen, P.C.; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Dunkel, No. 20040875 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5289

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff/Appellee,
vs.
CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL HI,

Case No. 20040875-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM A CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY TO
OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY, A FIRSTDEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §58-37D-4 AND 58-37D-5
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES
PRESIDING.

J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

JOHN T. CAINE (0536)
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C.
2550 Washington Boulevard, St. 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 366-0100

Telephone: (801)399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 2 5 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL III,

CaseNo.20040875-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM A CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY TO OPERATION
OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY, A FIRST-DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §58-37D-4 AND 58-37D-5 IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES PRESIDING.

J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

JOHN T. CAINE (0536)
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C.
2550 Washington Boulevard, St. 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801)366-0100

Telephone: (801)399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i, "

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

10

ARGUMENT

12

I.

DEPUTY HANEY DIDN'T ARTICULATE SPECIFIC
ARTICLUABLE FACTS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY A
LEVEL TWO DETENTION
12

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE DEFENDANT DIDN'T HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE CONTAINER IN
HIS TRUNK
24

CONCLUSION

28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

28

ADDENDA:
Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
Addendum B: Memorandum Decision on Motion to Suppress
Addendum C: Minutes Motion Hearing
Addendum D: Suppression Hearing Transcript R. 122 pgs 4-33

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
UNITED STATES COURT CASES
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)

24

Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 411 U.S. 365,375,386 (1986)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,143 (1978)

19,20
25

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668,686,687,688 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ,692, 693,
694(1984)
2,3,18,19,21,22
United States v. Williams, 111 F.3d 1262,1268 (10th Cir. 2001)

14

Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,9-10 (1982)

24

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484(1963)

23

UTAH STATE CASES
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
State v. Bissegger 76 P.3d 178,181 (Utah Ct. App.2003)

23
12,26

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1276, (Utah Ct. App.)

16

State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

24

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)

13

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)
State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7,10 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976,980, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

2, 23
14
20, 21

State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197,1200,1201 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)

22

State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346,350 (Utah 2000)

23

State v. Holmes, 114 P.2d 506,507,512 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
i

26,27
13

State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7,12 (Utah 2000)

13

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131,1132 (Utah 1994)
State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584,588 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4,5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

13,21
26
2,16

State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005,1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

25,26

State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,915 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

12,26

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 1990)
State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052,1054 (Ct. App. 2003)

2,21
3

OTHER STATE CASES
State v. Allen, 606 P.2d 1235,1236 (Wash. 1980)

27

STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 58-37d-4

1, 4, 5

Section 58-37d-5

1,4,5

Section 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1,5

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT 4

3,19,22, 23,24

AMENDMENT 6

3,4,18,21

u

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.
Case No. 20040875-CA
CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL, III
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to Operation of a
Clandestine Laboratory, a first-degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37d-4 and
58-37d-5. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence on April 4, 2003.
The motion was denied. The Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea on October
22, 2003 and was sentenced to a term of 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison on
March 31, 2004. On June 8, 2004, Defendant's attorney filed a motion for resentencing.

The motion was granted and the Defendant was re-sentenced on

September 15, 2004. The final order was signed on September 22, 2004. Defendant
filed a notice of appeal on October 7, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(2004).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I

DID DEPUTY HANEY ARTICULATE SPECIFIC
ARTICULABLE FACTS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY A
LEVEL TWO DETENTION?

Standard of Review: This issue should be reviewed under a correction of law
standard of review. Determination of "whether a set of facts supports a reasonable
articulable suspicion is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v.
Preece, 971 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Since this issue wasn't raised with the trial court it should be reviewed for
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. "[T]o establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant..." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
The appellate court must determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court
articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182
(Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
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defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id at 466 U.S.
at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
II

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE DEFENDANT DIDN'T HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE CONTAINER IN
HIS TRUNK?

Standard of Review:

The trial court's finding of facts should be

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions
of law should be reviewed for correctness. This is a search and seizure case,
therefore this Court should grant the trial court's legal determinations a measure of
discretion in applying the standard to the given facts. See, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d
1052, 1054 (Ct. App. 2003). This issue was preserved in the trial court when the
Defendant's attorney filed a written motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 023-26).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Sixth Amendment -In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
3

be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
Utah Code Annotated
Section 58-37d-4 -Clandestine Drug Lab Act- Prohibited acts — Second degree
felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it
will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled
Substance Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a
clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or manufacture a
controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58, Chapter 37,
Utah Controlled Substances Act;
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the intent to
distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or conveying the controlled
or counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless of whether the final
destination for the distribution is within this state or any other location; or
Section 58-37d-5- Clandestine Drug Lab Act - Prohibited acts — First degree
felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), (f), or (h) is guilty
of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous
material or while transporting or causing to be transported materials in furtherance of
a clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a substantial risk to human
health or safety or a danger to the environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500
feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
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(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a specified
controlled substance; or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of cocaine
base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in Subsections
(l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the violation, at
sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 2) The Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (j) cases
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with possession of clandestine
laboratory precursors or equipment, a first-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 5837d-4 and § 58-37d-5. (R. 013) The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence. (R. 023-26). A hearing was held on April 21, 2003. (R. 034). The trial
court denied the Defendant's motion. (R. 035-38).

On October 22, 2003, the

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge, preserving his rights to
appeal. (R. 045).
Due to some health problems, the Defendant wasn't sentenced until March 31,
2004. The trial court sentenced him to a term of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison.

(R. 074-75). The Defendant filed a motion to stay the imposition of

sentence and a certificate of probable cause. (R. 079-84). The trial court denied the
request on April 7, 2004. (R. 077).
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Defendant's trial counsel, Deven Coggins, didn't file an appeal. On June 8,
2004, he filed a document titled Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Request for
Re-sentencing, Nunc Pro Tunc. (R. 085-087). A hearing was held on September 15,
2004. The trial court granted the motion for post conviction relief and re-sentenced
the Defendant to the original term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. The
final order was signed on September 22, 2004. (R. 092-93). A notice of appeal was
filed by Defendant's appellate counsel on October 7, 2004. (R. 095)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 11, 2002, Deputy Steve Haney of the Weber County Sheriffs
Office initiated a traffic stop of the car the Defendant was driving. (R. 122/5-6).
Deputy Haney testified that the Defendant did not stop at a stop sign. (R. 122/5-6).
On direct examination Deputy Haney testified that the Defendant's car was coming
off the freeway. He said "[i]t was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my eye on it
because I thought I don't think he's going to stop, which, in fact, he didn't. He
entered onto 12th Street, I had to avoid hitting him. He almost ran into me on 12th
Street entering to go eastbound." (R. 122/5-6). On cross-examination, Defendant's
attorney referred Deputy Haney to his police report. After Deputy Haney looked at
his police report he said, "[i]t says here that he came to a stop after exiting 1-15
southbound."

Defendant's attorney then said, "[i]t also states that you - that the

vehicle was at the stop sign, it seemed to be waiting for traffic to clear?" Deputy
Haney's answer was "correct." (R. 122/14).
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Defendant's attorney then said "[s]o he didn't roll through the stop sign?"
Deputy Haney answered "[a]h, you know what? This was in my report, you know, I
stop people rolling through there all the time, maybe this right here is different. I - -"
(R. 122/14)
Defendant's attorney said "[y]ou have no explanation of why you testified - -"
Deputy Haney answered, "[y]ou know what? I thought that he rolled through
it." (R. 122/14).
On re-direct, the prosecutor said "[w]e've clarified in your report you stated
the defendant actually did come to a stop at the stop sign?"
Deputy Haney answered "[t]hat's what it says in my report." He was asked if
that was accurate. His answer was "I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the
stop so I would assume that's the correct way it happened."
The prosecutor then stated, "[s]o you stopped the defendant for this failure to
yield the right of way; is that correct?" (R. 122/18) Deputy Haney answered,
"Correct." (R. 122/19).
Deputy Haney who is a drug recognition expert testified that the Defendant
seemed "very lethargic." The Defendant "spoke thick tongued, his eyes seemed
droopy and he seemed disoriented." (R. 122/7).
The Defendant produced his driver's license and registration. Deputy Haney
didn't smell alcohol, but he was suspicious that the Defendant was under the
influence of a narcotic. (R. 122/7). Deputy Haney had the Defendant step out of the
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vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. (R. 122/7). The Defendant informed
Deputy Haney that he had some back and leg problems.

(R. 122/7-8).

The

Defendant told Deputy Haney that he had taken some Xanax earlier in the day. (R.
122/8). Defendant testified that he had just had neck surgery and he needed to have
three discs fused in his back. The Defendant told Deputy Haney that he had
prescriptions for Xanax and Oxycontin.

(R. 122/29).

Deputy Haney had the

Defendant perform the Romberg balance test. He estimated thirty seconds as fifteen
seconds. (R. 122/8-9). The Defendant was asked to perform the finger-to-nose test.
He missed the tip of his nose all six times. (R. 122/9).
Deputy Haney then asked the Defendant if he could search his vehicle for
narcotics. The Defendant gave him permission to do so. (R. 122/9). Deputy Haney
didn't take the Defendant into custody and didn't at any time charge the Defendant
with a DUI. (R. 122/17).

Deputy Haney was asked what part of the vehicle he

searched. His answer was "[b]y our policy when we search a vehicle it's bumper-tobumper, so I searched through the - you know, every bit of the front and the back
seat and then I opened up the trunk." (R. 122/9) Deputy didn't ask for permission to
search the trunk and the Defendant didn't open the trunk for him. Deputy Haney
took the key out of the ignition and opened the trunk. (R. 122/17)
Deputy Haney found a "big blue storage container" in the trunk. (R. 122/10).
Deputy Haney asked the Defendant what was in the container. The Defendant
answered "I don't know. It's my friends." (R. 122/10).
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Defendant testified that

when Deputy Haney found the blue container he asked "[w]hat do we have here?"
Defendant answered, "I'm not sure. It's a friend of mine's and I can't give you
permission to search it." (R. 122/30).
There was nothing about the container that suggested there was drug
paraphernalia inside it. (R. 122/18). Deputy Haney lifted the lid of the storage
container and discovered meth lab equipment which the Defendant's conviction was
based on. (R. 122/11).
While Deputy Haney was searching the Defendant's car the Defendant stood
with and spoke to Deputy Butler. (R. 122/24). They engaged in small talk. Deputy
Butler didn't have any problems understanding him. He testified that "I couldn't
smell alcohol or anything like that so I didn't believe he was intoxicated or anything
like that. He was a little slow, you know, type thing, but he said he was tired so - -"
(R. 122/25).
The trial court took the matter under advisement. The court issued a written
memorandum decision. (R. 035-38). The following findings are of significance to
this appeal.
6.

Officer Haney asked the defendant if he could search the car for
drugs. The defendant gave the officer permission to search.

7.

Officer Haney found a large blue plastic container in the trunk of
the vehicle.

8.

The Defendant said he did not own the blue container
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9.

The defendant said that he could not give permission to search
the blue container because he did not own it.

10.

Officer Haney opened the container and found the drugs and
paraphernalia in the container.

13.

The court finds that the defendant did not revoke his consent to
search the vehicle.

14.

The defendant said, "I do not own the container. The container
belongs to a friend. I cannot give permission to search it."

15.

The defendant was not revoking his consent to search.

16.

The defendant was claiming that since he does not own the
container, he cannot give permission to search it. The defendant
was claiming the he does not have authority from the owner to
grant the search.

17.

The Court finds that the defendant did not have standing to
suppress the contents of the container because he claims he
doesn't own the container. (R. 035-037).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion to suppress the search of a
container that was found in the Defendant's trunk. During the suppression hearing it
became apparent that the officer didn't recall the circumstances surrounding the
traffic stop of the Defendant. Deputy Haney testified that Defendant didn't stop for

10

a stop sign and pulled out into traffic almost hitting him. Deputy Haney9 s police
report was inconsistent with his sworn testimony. The prosecutor attempted to
rehabilitate Deputy Haney's testimony. The prosecutor made a conclusory statement,
"So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way; is that
correct?" (R. 122/18). Deputy Haney answered, "Correct."
The prosecutor didn't use Deputy Haney's report to refresh his memory or to
clarify what the Defendant actually did that was a traffic violation. Therefore, this
Court has no way of analyzing the circumstances surrounding the stop to determine
if there were specific articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that Defendant had committed a traffic violation.
Defendant's attorney's failure to recognize this deficiency and raise it with the
trial court amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court should find that
failure to alert the Court to the Constitutional issue was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and find that the traffic stop was not supported by a reasonable
articulable suspicion.
Defendant's trial counsel did file a motion to suppress challenging the search
of a container in Defendant's trunk. During the course of the traffic stop Defendant
consented to a search of his vehicle. Deputy Haney removed the keys from the
ignition and opened the trunk. Inside the trunk was a large blue container. Deputy
Haney asked Defendant what was in the container and Defendant informed him that
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it was a friend's and he couldn't give permission to search it. Deputy Haney
searched it anyway and found equipment for a methamphetamine lab.
The trial court found that Defendant did not revoke his consent and since
Defendant claimed that he did not own the container he did not have standing to
challenge the search of it. These findings were incorrect.
This Court should employ the two-step test articulated in State v. Sepulveda,
842 P.2d 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Has the defendant demonstrated a subjective
expectation of privacy in the searched area? and is the expectation objectively
reasonable?
The container was in Defendant's trunk and Defendant was the driver and sole
occupant of the vehicle. This Court held in State v. Bissegger 76 P.3d 178, 181
(Utah Ct. App.2003) that driver's of vehicles have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle.
The trial court erred when it found that Defendant did not revoke his consent
and that he did not have standing to challenge the search.

The Defendant

specifically told the officers that he could not give permission to search the container
and as owner and driver of the vehicle the Defendant has standing to challenge the
search even though he claimed it was a friends.
ARGUMENT
L
DEPUTY HANEY DIDN'T ARTICULATE SPECIFIC
ARTICLUABLE FACTS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY A LEVEL
TWO DETENTION

12

There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters
between law enforcement officers and the general public.
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop';
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed."
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(citations
omitted).
In the case at bar, Deputy Haney initiated a level two detention when he stopped
the Defendant's vehicle. An officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when the
officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic
offense . . ." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). The State has the
burden of establishing those articulable facts. See, State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7, 12
(Utah 2000).
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, courts should
"look to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective
basis for suspecting criminal activity." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997). When considering the totality of the circumstances the officer's
conduct should be judged "in light of common sense and ordinary human experience
. . . and we accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent
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and suspicious actions." United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir.
2001).
Reasonable suspicion must also be judged against an objective standard. This
Court must consider "whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the
officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's
personal security." State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Deputy Haney had the burden of establishing specific articulable facts to
support the detention. "In determining whether this objective standard has been met,
the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before
the stop." State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d at 10.
Deputy Haney testified at the suppression hearing about his reasons for
stopping the Defendant. He was asked if he recalled the stop. He answered that he
did. (R. 122/5). Deputy Haney was then very specific about what happened. He
testified; "I was on 1200 South approaching the freeway, the freeway off-ramp from
where people would get off coming southbound, I believe, on 1-15.

I was

approaching that when I saw a car coming off the freeway, it was a approaching the
stop sign. It was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my eye on it because I
thought I don't think he's going to stop, which, in fact, he didn't. He entered onto
12th Street, I had to avoid hitting him. He almost ran into me on 12th Street entering
to go eastbound." (R. 122/5-6).
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Deputy Haney also testified that he "had to take evasive action. I had to hit
my brakes, I had [sic] change lanes, I almost hit another car that was in the number
two lane also traveling eastbound to avoid hitting the car." (R. 122/6).
On their face, those facts would certainly amount to reasonable suspicion and
even probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred. The problem in this case is
that it is clear from cross-examination that Deputy Haney didn't remember what had
happened and that the Defendant did stop at the stop sign. Defendant's attorney had
Deputy Haney diagram the incident.

After Deputy Haney finished, Defendant's

attorney had him refer to his police report and asked him if he wanted to change his
testimony about the stop.

Deputy Haney looked at his police report and then

answered, "Yes. It says here that he came to a stop after exiting 1-15 southbound."
(R. 122/14).
The following colloquy occurred between Defendant's attorney and Deputy
Haney.
Q

And then it also states that you - - that the vehicle was at the stop sign,

it seemed to be waiting for traffic to clear.
A.

Correct.

Q.

So he didn't roll through the stop sign?

A.

Ah, you know what? This was in my report, you know, I stop people

rolling through there all the time, maybe this right here is different. I - Q.

You have no explanation of why you testified - -
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A.

You know what? I thought that he rolled through it.

(R. 122/14). Defendant's attorney didn't ask any more questions about the stop. On
re-direct examination the following colloquy took place between the prosecutor and
Deputy Haney.
Q.

We've clarified in your report you stated the defendant actually did

come to a stop at the stop sign?
A.

That's what it says in my report.

Q.

Is that accurate then? Is that - -

A.

I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the stop so I would

assume that's the correct way it happened.
Q.

So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way;

is that correct?
A.

Correct.

(R. 122/18-19). Defendant's attorney didn't ask any further questions about the stop.
It is well settled that if a traffic violation is committed in an officer's presence
the officer has not only reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to stop the vehicle.
See, State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the State bears
the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion. In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1276, (Utah Ct. App.), this Court re-iterated that "the State bears the initial burden
for establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary to
support an investigative stop."
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In the case at bar, Deputy Haney failed to meet this burden. He supposedly
remembered the incident and testified that Defendant's vehicle was approaching a
stop sign at a fairly high rate of speed, that it appeared the vehicle wasn't going to
stop, that the vehicle didn't stop and that he [Deputy Haney] had to take evasive
action to avoid the Defendant's vehicle.
If these facts were accurate they would justify the stop and detention of the
Defendant. However, it was clear on cross-examination that Deputy Haney didn't
remember the incident and that his sworn testimony was inaccurate.

He

acknowledged that his police report stated that the Defendant did stop for the stop
sign, but "I thought he rolled through it." (R. 122/14). When the prosecutor asked
him if his report was accurate Deputy Haney stated, "I would assume so if I wrote it
at the time of the stop so I would assume that's the correct way it happened." (R.
122/18).
The prosecutor didn't ask Deputy Haney what his report actually said. The
prosecutor just made the conclusory statement formed as a question, "[s]o you
stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the right of way; is that correct?"
Defendant replied, "[c]orrect." (R. 122/18-19).
The problem here, is we know that Deputy Haney's original testimony
concerning Defendant's alleged traffic violation was inaccurate and inconsistent with
his police report. In an attempt to rehabilitate his witness, the prosecutor made the
conclusory statement that he had "stopped the defendant for this failure to yield the
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right of way; is that correct?" (R. 122/18). The prosecutor didn't have the deputy
refer back to his police report to refresh his memory and didn't have him testify to
the details of the report. Since we don't know what the Defendant really did, it is
impossible to examine it to determine if what he did was a violation of the law and
whether Deputy Haney had specific articulate facts that would justify a level two
detention. It's the State's burden to establish these facts, and the State failed in this
regard.
Furthermore, although Defendant's attorney appropriately challenged the
search of the container in the vehicle, he failed to raise this issue with the trial court
so it should analyzed under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as well as
plain error.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984).

In Strickland, the Supreme Court

established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective.
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some
guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
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reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. Although the Court
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", Id. at 688, it did mention
certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments
in the course of the prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching
requirement by the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688.
Other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels performance
has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was presented
with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did
not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th Amendment.

The

Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to be deficient. The Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and
that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual
prejudice. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to
comport with constitutional requirements the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance
in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386
(1986).
In State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court reversed a
conviction where a defense attorney failed to renew a motion to suppress during a
trial. Based on the investigating officers trial testimony it became clear that the
contraband he found was not in plain view. Id at 976. This Court found that the
defense attorney was ineffective. "Having determined that defendant's trial counsel
performed deficiently in failing to renew his suppression motion at trial,... we must
now determine whether the admission of the tin evidence in this case was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 980.
This Court found that since the conviction was based on the evidence found in
the tin, admission was prejudicial.

"[B]ecause that evidence was necessary to

establish defendant's praraphernalia and drug possession charges, we conclude that
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defense counsel's failure to renew his suppression motion after Deputy Zwemke's
trial testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 981.
The second prong of the Strickland test is whether "counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. In Strickland, the Court held that
"[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court held that to meet the second part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination
that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider the totality of the
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is
supported by the record." Id.
In the case at bar, both prongs of the Strickland test are met. The law is well
settled that on this issue and thus, Defendant's attorney should have recognized and
challenged the initial detention. "The right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures extends to a person's automobile." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131
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(Utah 1994).

A law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion that the

vehicle is being operated in violation of the law before he can make a traffic stop.
See, State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197, 1200, (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The reasonable
suspicion must be judged "against an objective standard - - that is, whether there
were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which taken together with
rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal security." Id.
To determine whether this objective standard has been met, "the focus
necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop."
Id. The State has the burden of establishing these articulable facts. (Infra)
In State v. Galvan, 37 P.3d 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this Court suppressed
the evidence when a trooper stopped a vehicle without reasonable suspicion.
"Trooper needed reasonable suspicion that there was a safety equipment violation in
order to conduct a valid stop. . . . " Id. at 1201.
Defense counsel's failure to raise the lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. It meets both requirements of the
Strickland test. Failing to recognize the lack of reasonable suspicion was deficient.
Defense counsel should have recognized and raised this basic Fourth Amendment
violation. Second, failure to raise the issue prejudiced the Defendant and there was
an unreliable result.

A ruling that the stop was not supported by reasonable

suspicion would have resulted in the evidence being suppressed. "Absent reasonable
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suspicion, evidence derived from the stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree."' State v.
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

For these reasons, both requirements of the

ineffective assistance test are met.
In addition, it was plain error for the trial court to not recognize the Fourth
Amendment violation. In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000) the Utah
Supreme Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may
not be raised on appeal." A defendant must show the following to establish plain
error, "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208
(Utah 1993).
In this case all three elements of plain error have been met. (1) The error
exists. Defense counsel's failure to alert the court to an obvious Fourth Amendment
violation was error. (2) This error should have been obvious to the trial court. This
area of law is well settled in Utah as the case cited above show. (3) Absent the error
there is a likelihood of a more favorable outcome. If the trial court had recognized
that the State didn't meet its burden concerning the reasonable suspicion for the stop,
the appropriate remedy would have been suppression of the evidence.
The State failed to present reliable evidence that the Defendant committed a
traffic violation in Deputy Hadley's presence. It was clear that Deputy Hadley
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didn't remember the specifics of his encounter with the Defendant and that his sworn
testimony was in conflict with his police report. The prosecutor never did establish
reliable evidence that the trial court could rely on to find that the stop was supported
by specific and articulable facts. Defendant's counsel's failure to recognize and
raise this issue was ineffective and it was plain error for the trial court to not
recognize the Fourth Amendment violation.

For these reasons, the Defendant

respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE DEFENDANT DIDN'T HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE CONTAINER IN
HIS TRUNK.

Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers can search without a
warrant if they have consent. See, Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1982). However, a person can limit the scope of his consent. See, State v. Castner,
825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "The standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness
- - what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
In the case at bar, the Defendant clearly limited the scope of his consent.
During the encounter with the Defendant Deputy Haney asked for consent to search
Defendant's vehicle for narcotics. (R. 122/9). Defendant gave him consent to
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search. Deputy Haney conducted a "bumper to bumper" search. (R. 122/9) After
Deputy Haney searched the interior of the vehicle he removed the keys from the
ignition and opened the trunk. (R. 122/9-10). Inside the trunk was a blue container.
(R. 122/10). Defendant informed Deputy Haney that the container was a friend's
and he couldn't give permission to search it. (R. 122/30). After the Defendant gave
this response, Deputy Haney lifted the lid and discovered what appeared to be a
methamphetamine lab. (R. 122/11).
When the Defendant's words are measured under an objective standard, the
"typical reasonable person" would understand that the Defendant did not give
Deputy Haney permission to search the container in his trunk. The trial court was
very clear in its findings that the Defendant said "the container belongs to a friend. I
cannot give permission to search it." (R. 036).
The trial court ruled that since the Defendant claimed that he didn't own the
container, he didn't have standing to challenge the search of it. (R. 036-37, #17).
Since the Defendant specifically limited the scope of the consent, the analysis in this
case is whether the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
container. See, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), State v. Scott, 860 P.2d
1005, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("[T]o challenge the propriety of a search, a
defendant must first establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place.")
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To determine whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy
appellate courts "employ a two-step test." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 915
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). First, the court should examine whether the defendant has
demonstrated "a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched area." State v.
Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007. Second, the court must determine whether "the defendant's
expectation was objectively reasonable . ." State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178, 181
(Utah Ct. App. 2003).
In the case at bar, the Defendant was both the driver and the owner of the
vehicle that was searched. (R. 122/27-33). Based on these facts, the Defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle. In State v. Bisseger, this Court
stated, "[w]e have held that a driver of a car who has either an ownership interest in
the car or 'permissive, possessory control of the car' has standing to challenge a
search of the car." Id. (quoting, State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
The trial court was incorrect when it ruled that Defendant did not have
standing to challenge the search of the container. There was a somewhat similar
factual pattern in the case of State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In
Holmes, an officer stopped the defendant in her vehicle. The officer testified that the
defendant looked back over her shoulder and removed a roll of paper towels from
her purse and attempted to stuff it down between the car seat and the console. When
the arresting officer asked the defendant for the roll of paper towels, she denied it
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was hers. The officer reached into the car and removed the roll. Inside were two
syringes that contained cocaine. Id. at 507.
The State argued that the defendant didn't have standing to challenge the
search since she claimed she didn't own the paper towels. In footnote five, this Court
stated, "the trial court here necessarily determined that standing was not at issue.
We note that a mere disclaimer of ownership in the context of a police query is
insufficient in itself to make such an assertion." Id. at 512, fn. 5.
This Court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress. Although, it wasn't addressed other than in the footnote, this Court
obviously agreed with the trial court that the defendant did have standing to
challenge the search. In the footnote this Court cited State v. Allen, 606 P.2d 1235
(Wash. 1980). In Allen, the Washington Supreme Court held that a defendant had
standing to challenge the search of a wallet on his person even though he denied
ownership of it. "Since it was found on his person and the fruits of the search were
proposed to be used against him, we have no question Allen has standing to
challenge the search." Id. at 1236.
In the case at bar, the container was in the Defendant's trunk. He therefore
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the container even though he denied
ownership of the container. It was in his possession and the State charged him with
knowingly possessing the items that were in the it. The State can't have it both
ways. It would be inconsistent to deny him standing under these circumstances.
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The trial court's legal conclusions that the Defendant lacked standing to
challenge the search of the container were in error. The Defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the container and he specifically limited his consent
concerning the container. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The State failed to provide specific articulate facts that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that Defendant committed a traffic offense. In addition,
the Defendant did not consent to a search of the container in his trunk. The trial
court's legal conclusion were incorrect when it ruled that that the Defendant did not
have standing to challenge the search of the container.

The Defendant had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. For these reasons the trial court's
/

denial of Defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed.
DATED this VJday 0 f April, 2005.
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ADDENDUM A

SECOND DISTRICT COO^t "'-'•''odJbEN" COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,ir,_
• 'ir'CTCQimi
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 021904753 FS

CASPER MICHAEL III DUNKEL,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

n-

ERNIE W JONES
March 31, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): COGGINS, DEVEN J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 4, 1952
Video
Tape Count: 3:07
CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY (amended) - 1st Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/22/2003 Guilty
HEARING
The Court proceeds with sentencing. Attorney Coggins indicates
that if the defendant is sentenced to prison, he intends to file a
motion to stay the sentence pending an appeal regarding the courtfs
ruling on a motion to suppress.
The Court proceeds with sentencing, and directs Mr. Coggins to
file a certificate of probable cause if he believes that is
appropriate. (Mr. Coggins may file the motion on or before April
6, hearing is set April 7. Jail personnel
have been requested not to transport the defendant to the prison
pending that hearing).
Page 1

nn

Case No: 021904753
Date:
Mar 31, 2004

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

HEARING ON CERT PROB CAUSE is scheduled.
Date: 04/07/2004
Time: 02 : 00 p.m.
Location: 4th Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2 52 5 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: ERNIE W JONES
Dated this

") day of

A ^K
fearIIE W

r-H^y-

JONES
District Court Ju

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding. The general information phone number is (801)
395-1071.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL D ^ M C T b b U R T , STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DE^»3DI(IENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff

Case No. 021904753

vs.

Ernie W. Jones
District Judge

CASPER DUNKEL,

Defendant.

Defendant's motion to suppress came on for hearing before the Honorable Ernie Jones on
April H 2003. The State was represented by Attorney Brandon Maynard. The defendant was present
and represented by Attorney Deven Coggins. The Court heard testimony from Officer Steve Haney,
Officer Brent Butler and Casper Dunkel. The Court reviewed the memorandums of law and heard
the arguments of counsel. The Court enters the following findings:
1. The defendant was stopped by Deputy Haney for a traffic violation.
2. The defendant appeared to be disoriented. He had droopy eyes, thick tongue, slurred
speech and was slow and confused.
3. Deputy Haney is a DRE (Drug Recognition Expert) and thought the defendant was under
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the influence of drugs
4. The defendant admitted he had used Xanax earlier in the day.
5. The defendant failed several field sobriety tests conducted by Officer Haney.
6. Officer Haney asked the defendant if he could search the car for drugs. The defendant
gave the officer permission to search.
7. Officer Haney found a large blue plastic storage container in the trunk of the vehicle.
8. The defendant said he did not own the blue container.
9. The defendant said he could not give permission to search the blue container because he
did not own it.
10. Officer Haney opened the container and found drugs and drug paraphernalia inside.
11. The defendant claims there was no consent to search the container.
12. The State argues that the defendant gave consent to search the vehicle, or in the
alternative, the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search because the defendant claims no
ownership of the container.
13. The Court finds that the defendant did not revoke his consent to search the vehicle.
14. The defendant said, "I do not own the container. The container belongs to a friend. I
cannot give permission to search it."
15. The defendant was not revoking his consent to search.
16. The defendant was claiming that since he does not own the container, he cannot give
permission to search it. The defendant was claiming he does not have authority from the owner to
grant the search.
17. The Court finds that the defendant does not have standing to suppress the contents of the
Page 2 of 4
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container because the defendant claims he doesniJt own the container.
18. The Court will deny defendant's motion to suppress.
19. The State will prepare an order consistent with this decision.

^W

Dated this ^-f5 of , -\p

M . , 2003
..--7

c -ERNIE JONES
DISTRICT COURT JUDfGE
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State vs. Dunkel,
Case #021904753

Certificate of Mailing:
I hereby certify that on the A > ^ of April, 2003, 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing order to
counsel, as follows:

^£\

Brandon Maynard
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230
Ogden, UT 84401

r.fl m Deven Coggins
<pj. &' Attorney
Attorneyfor
forDeDefendant
th
289 24 Street, Ste 150
Ogden, UT 84401

\$mlUmmA
V^nna Woodrin$
Ljfead Deputy C(h)rt Clerk
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ADDENDUM C

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION HEARING

vs.

Case No: 021904753 FS

CASPER MICHAEL III DUNKEL,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ERNIE W JONES
September 15, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN
Prosecutor: PARMLEY, RICHARD A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): COGGINS, DEVEN J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 4, 1952
Video
Tape Count: 2:55
CHARGES
1. OPERATION OF A CLANDESTINE LABORATORY (amended) - 1st Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/22/2003 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for hearing on defendant's motion for
resentencing, to preserve appeal rights. The Court finds that the
motion is appropriate. The defendant is resentenced nunc pro tunc,
and previous sentence stands but the
sentence is effective as of today, in order to preserve
defendant's appeals rights. The defendant requests that Mr.
Coggins withdraw, Mr. Coggins is ordered withdrawn as counsel. The
Court notifies the defendant that he has 30 days

oy2
Page 1

Case No: 021904753
Date:
Sep 15, 2004
from today's date to file his appeal.
Dated this 7-P~ day of , C-J^^-^t

20 . ° *• /

TIRNIE W JONES
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM D

I call him.
THE COURT:

How about for the defense, are you going

to call any witnesses?
MR. COGGINS:
THE COURT:

Just my client, your Honor.

All right.

sworn in then at this time.

Let's have the witnesses

Mr. Coggins, let's have your

client sworn if he's going to testify.
THE CLERK:

Raise your right hand.

(Whereupon the witnesses were sworn.)
THE COURT:

All right.

Did you want to take up

anything preliminarily before we start?

Anything we need to

discuss?
MR. COGGINS:
much state our —

No.

I believe the motion's pretty

or the memorandums pretty much state our

position.
THE COURT:
your memorandums.

And I have had a chance to read both
Go ahead and call your first witness then.

MR. MAYNARD:

Your Honor, the state calls Deputy

Haney.

STEVE HANEY,
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MAXNARD:
Q.

Go ahead and introduce yourself to the Court.

A.

Deputy Steve Haney, Weber County sheriff!s office.
THE COURT:

Just for the record, how do you spell

your last name?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

H-A-N-E-Y.
How long have you been with the

sheriff's office?
A.

Six years.

Q.

Did you work on October 11th of the last year as a deputy

county sheriff?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Let's talk about a stop that you investigated with the

Casper Dunkel.

Do you recall that stop?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And what was that —

A.

Let's see, the stop was made at —

about what time was that?
the stop was made at

2033.
Q.

Describe how that took place.

A.

I was eastbound on 1200 South approaching the freeway,

the freeway off-ramp from where people would get off coming
southbound, I believe, on 1-15.

I was approaching that when

I saw a car coming off the freeway, it was a approaching the
stop sign.

It was traveling pretty fast so I kind of kept my

eye on it because I thought I don't think he's going to stop,
which, in fact, he didn't.
had to avoid hitting him.

He entered onto 12th Street, I
He almost ran into me on 12th

1

Street entering to go eastbound.

2

Q-

3

avoid hitting him, what did you do

4

A.

5

hit my brakes, I had change lanes, I almost hit another car

6

that was in the number two lane also traveling eastbound to

7

avoid hitting the car.

8

Q-

9

traffic stop.

Describe when you —

I had to take —

when you say had to do something to
—

I had to take evasive action.

Describe what you did then when you —

once you made the

10

A.

11

and approached the driver of the vehicle.

12

Q-

13

A.

Only one.

14

Q.

And do you recognize the driver of the vehicle in the

15

courtroom today?

16

A.

Yes, I do.

17

Q.

Would you point him out to the Court?

18

A

-

I initiated my overhead lights.

I had to

How

many people were in the vehicle?

He's right here at the defendant's table with the

19

off-white shirt here.

20

MR. MAYNARD:

21

Your Honor, I'd ask that the record

reflect he indicated the defendant.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. COGGINS:

24

THE COURT:

25

I pulled over the car

Any objection to the identification?
No, your Honor.
All right.

The record will reflect that

Officer Haney has identified the defendant.

7

Q.

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

What do you the n once you got up to the

driver?
A.

I just made some real quick observations.

He -- the

driver, Casper Dunkel, III, was — he seemed very 1 ethargic,
he 1had -— he spoke very thick tongued , his eyes seemed droopy
and he iseemed disoriented.
Q.

Did you ask him for his identification?

A.

Yes

Q.

Was he able to produce that?

A.

Let fs see.

I ask for identification on all my stops.

Yes, he did.

He was —

again, he s eemed very

slow. ]He seemed very confused while he was trying to find
his license and registration.
Q.

Did you have any —

did you have any suspicions at that

point after speaking with him and observing his
characteristics or his face?
A.

Being a drug recognition expert, I —

and not smelling

alcohol, I had suspicion that he might be under the influence
of a narcotic.
Q.

Did you ask him'about that, about his narcotics use?

A.

Yes, I did.

I asked him if he had been taking any

medlication tonight, had anything to drink, he said no.
Q.

What d id you do then?

A.

I had him step out of vehicle to perform some

standardiz ed field sobriety tests , which he did. Asked h:Lm

1 if

he had any physical ailments.

He said that he did, he had

1

some backache, leg problems.
MR. MAYNARD:

2
3

witness?

Your Honor, may I approach the

I have a —

4

THE COURT: Yes.

5

MR. MAYNARD:

something I would like to show him.

6

Q.

7

his medication.

8

your report and then —

9

A.

You know, I just saw this on my report.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

When he said no, I didn't read on.

12

that he took some Xanax earlier in the day before we started

13

the field sobriety tests.

14

Q.

So you had that information prior to starting

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

-- field sobriety?

17

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

—

I asked you a question earlier about

I'm going to have you read this paragraph of

He actually admitted

—

All right.

Describe what took place then once you had the defendant

18

step out to do field sobriety.

19

A.

What was that question again?

20

Q.

Describe what happened next when you had the defendant

21

step out and do field sobriety tests.

22

A.

23

The first — this is spelled wrong in my report, I don't know

24

if itfs spelled wrong in yourfs, it's the Romberg 1balance

25

test, having the subject estimate 30 seconds in his head

I had Mr . Dunkel do a couple of divided attent ion tests.

1

while, you know, eyes closed, head tilted back.

Mr. Dunkel

2

estimated 30 seconds as 15 seconds.

3

from front and back and one inch side to side.

4

test I did was a finger-to-nose test.

5

tip of his nose all six times.

6

Q.

7

you do any other field sobriety tests?

8

A.

No, I did not do any more.

9

Q-

Well, what happened after you performed -- completed the

He swayed two inches
The other

Mr. Dunkel missed the

Once you had performed these field sobriety tests, did

10

field sobriety tests?

11

A.

12

medications or drugs which he said no. At that point, I

13

asked him if I could —

14

other narcotics which he said I could.

15

Q.

16

search the vehicle?

17

A.

18

had him watch Mr. Dunkel by the front of my car, I began to

19

search his vehicle.

20

Q.

What portion of the vehicle did you search?

21

A.

By our policy when we search a vehicle it's

22

bumper-to-bumper, so I searched through the —

23

every bit of the front and the back seat and then I opened up

24

the trunk.

25

Q.

I asked him if there was -- if he was on any other

if I could search his car for any

What did you do once he had given you permission to

By that time Deputy Butler had arrived on the scene and I

What did —

you know,

did you find anything while you were

1

searching the trunk?

2

A.

3

I found a big blue storage container, big blue plastic

I storage container that was sitting in the trunk with some —

4

that was just sitting there.

5

Q-

About how big would you describe it?

6

A.

It was one of the large containers that you can by at

7

any, you know, Wal-Mart, Target.

8

with the handles on it, you know, about I!d say about that

9

deep (indicating).

10

Q.

11

about 3 feet wide?

So you're saying about what, 2 feet deep maybe

-

Itfs —

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

I imagine.

15

Q.

Around that size?

16

A.

Yeah, it was one of the larger ones.

17

Q-

What did you do once you saw that?

18

A.

I asked Mr. Dunkel if it was his.

19

Q.

And what was his response?

20

A.

Actually —

21

asked him what was in it, is what I asked him.

22

"What's in this?"

23

Q-

And how did he respond?

24

A.

He said —

25

know.

12

A

Okay.

You know, about yea long

it's about that, yeah.
By what, about a foot and a half 2 feet wide?

I think actually what I did ask him — I
I asked,

I believe I have it quoted as saying, "I don't

It's my friend's."

11

Q.

Do you have that quoted from your report?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

What happened after he gave this response?

A.

I lifted up the lid on top of the plastic container and

saw there was glassware and other items that appeared to be
meth lab.
MR. MAYNARD:

Your Honor, I believe at this point I

have no further questions.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. COGGINS:

Any cross?

Thank you, your Honor.
C30SS-EXAMINATICN

BY MR. OOQGINS:
Q.

Deputy Haney, my name is Devin Coggins and I represent

Mr. Dunkel.
First question I have is:

Is your car equipped with a

video unit?
A.

It is now.

Q.

It wasn't at the time?

A.

At the time my car was being outfitted with one.

The

actual recording device was in New Jersey getting fixed, it
was under repair, so no, it was not active at the time.
Q.

I!m sorry I missed the name, but the other deputy that

came later, what was his name?
A.

Deputy Brent Butler.

Q.

Did he come in a separate squad car as well?

1

A.

Yes, sir.

2

Q.

Do you know if his car was equipped with a video?

3

A.

It is equipped with a video, I don't know if it was on or

4

not.

5

Q-

6

Okay.

Thank you.

Now, let's talk about when you first observed the

7

vehicle.

Now, I'm going from recollection here on when you

8

come off of the freeway at that 1200, when you come off

9

southbound on 1-15, you come to a stop sign and then there's

10

a light, correct?

11

A.

12

It's just a stop sign controlling that intersection.

13

Q.

14

there to direct the traffic that's heading eastbound?

15

A.

There is a median there, yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

something

There is no traffic —

there is no traffic signal there.

Is there some sort of median, some sort of a turn median

And how far does that -- if I may, is there
—

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. COGGINS:

20

THE COURT:
(BY MR. COGGINS)

Yeah, you can flip that around.
Thank you, your Honor.

There should be a blackboard there.

21

Q.

Officer, here is my understanding of —

22

here is going to be 1-15, okay.

23

it's my recollection that there's kind of a U-turn or a

24

wraparound you take to get onto 1200 off the 12th Street

25

exit; is that correct?

We've got north, okay.

And

13

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

That's for northbound exiting onto 12th Street.

So —
We're

talking southbound which exit is on the other side of the
freeway.
Q.

Oh, okay.

A.

So I can get up and draw it if you'd like.

Q.

That would probably work better.

A.

This is 12th Street right here.

northbound —

if you're going northbound, yes, it does loop

around and come back.

But if you're heading southbound it

exits right here, comes by —
here.

And, yes, there is for

the Pilot Situation is right

You come off, there is just a stop sign that is all

that is regulating coming onto 12th Street off the freeway
here.
He approached here, he slowed down.
way.

I was headed this

There is a median right here that you can go into, he

did not go into it.

He rolled through the stop sign.

As I

came up here, he came out into here as I was coming up right
here.

I had to brake right here, I had to move over into

this lane.

There was actually a car here that also slammed

on its brakes, I avoided that car and he came into the number
one lane right here.
Q.

Okay.

And you pulled him over somewhere

A.

Right here.

—

1 4

Q.

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you, that clears that up for me.

Okay.

Now, Deputy, it's —

you testified that he did not

stop at the stop sign; is that correct?
A.

He rolled through it.

Q.

Okay.

And you do have your report in front of you; is

that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And at the beginning of your report in the narrative

section would you —

do you want to change your answer at all

on whether or not he stopped after reviewing that?
A.

Yes.

It says here that he came to a stop after exiting

1-15 southbound.
Q.

And then it also states that you —

that the vehicle was

at the stop sign, it seemed to be waiting for traffic to
clear?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So he didn't roll through the stop sign?

A.

Ah, you know what?

This was in my report, you know, I

stop people rolling through there all the time, maybe this
right here is different.

I --

Q.

You have no explanation of why you testified --

A.

You know what?

Q.

Okay.

I thought that he rolled through it.

Now, once you approached the vehicle, you

indicated that his speech was —
thick tongued?

how did you describe it,

15

A.

It was thick tongued.

Q.

Okay.

And was there anything else other than his speech

that you noticed?
A.

Other than his speech?

Q. Yes.
A.

His eyes were droopy, seemed very disoriented.

Like I

said, when he was getting his license and registration he
seemed very confused.
Q.

Did he seem nervous?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now, in your experience when you pull people over

are they sometimes nervous or shaky when they're trying to
get their license and registration out?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And are they that way even when you do not suspect them

of any narcotics or any alcohol or anything like that?
A.

I don't understand the question.

Q.

Okay.

You indicated that there are people that are

nervous, have difficulty getting their licenses out.
A.

There are people that are nervous, but as far as

difficulty getting their information out, not unless they're
usually impaired.
Q.

So you've never had anyone that was not impaired take

their —
wallet?

have trouble getting their license out of their

io

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

Usually it's a pretty easy transition.
You also indicated that you did not smell any

alcohol.
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Okay.

When you asked him about drug use he mentioned he

had had a Xanax earlier, are you familiar with Xanax?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

Did you ask him how much earlier he had had that?

A.

He said he took earlier, that's all I have down in my

notes.
Q.

Okay.

So based upon —

based upon this, you conducted

some field sobriety tests?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And did you give him any —

any balance test as far as

the walk and turn, one-leg stand, anything like that?
A.

The reason why I did not perform the walk and turn and

balance test was because he did tell me that he had ailments
such as back, neck, and leg problems, I did not want it to be
skewed in any way.
Q.

Okay.

A

Especially out on the roadside with cars driving by.

Q

Did you conduct an HGN?

A

I don't have it down here.

Q

What about a vertical gaze?

A

Again, I don't have it down here.

17

Q.

Okay.

Was there anything preventing you from performing

the vertical gaze nystagmus or the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

So after this you determined that —

him the test, you asked him to get out —

well, after you gave
or you then asked

him if you could search the car?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You didn't take him into custody at that point?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now, when you asked him to search the car, did you

tell him that you would be searching the trunk?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I opened it.

Q.

How did you open it?

A.

With a key.

Q.

Okay.

A.

The key was in the ignition.

Q.

So you took the key out of ignition to open the trunk?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now, when you noticed this container, was it taped shut?

A.

If I remember, it did have some tape around it but it

Did he open the trunk for you or did you open it?

Where did you get the key?

wasn't taped shut.
Q.

Okay.

But you don't have anything about tape in your

1

report?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

And when you asked him about the container, isnft it true

4

that he told you that he couldn't tell you —

5

give you consent to search that container?

6

A.

All he said was, "I don't know.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

announced to you that inside of it there was any

9

paraphernalia?

It!s my friend's."

Is there anything about that container that

10

A.

Just by looking at it, no.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

MR. COGGINS:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MAYNARD:

15

THE COURT:

16
17

he couldn't

Thank you.

That's all I have.

Any other questions?
One follow-up area, your Honor.
Okay.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MOXNARD:

18

Q.

We've clarified in your report you stated the defendant

19

actually did come to a stop at the stop sign?

20

A.

That's what it says in my report.

21

Q.

Is that accurate then?

22

A.

I would assume so if I wrote it at the time of the stop

23

so I would assume that's the correct way it happened.

24

Q.

25

the right of way; is that correct?

Is that --

So you stopped the defendant for this failure to yield

19

A.

Correct.
MR. MAYNARD:

No further questions.

I just wanted

to clear that up, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. COGGINS:
THE COURT:
Thank you.

No follow-up, your Honor.

All right.

Officer, you may step down.

Call your next witness.

MR. MAYNARD:

Your Honor, the state calls Deputy

Brent Butler.

BRENT BUTLER,
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:

DIRECT EXZ4433SEATICN
BY MR. M&XNRRD:
Q.

Please introduce yourself, first and last name and then

also spell your last name for the record.
A.

Brent Butler, B-U-T-L-E-R, deputy with the Weber County

sheriff's office.
Q.

How long have you been with the sheriff1s office?

A.

I think about eight and a half, nine years.

Q.

We're talking today about October 11th of last year,

around 8:30 you were called as a backup to Deputy Haney; is
that correct?
A.

Actually, I was —

I was working a traffic shift.

I just

came up the road, Deputy Haney was on a traffic stop so I

1

stopped to assist.

2

Q.

At what point did you arrive?

3

A.

Looking at my times on my report from dispatch it was

4

8:40.

5

minutes.

6

Q.

What did you observe when you got there?

7

A.

When I arrived Deputy Haney was talking with the driver.

8

I got out of my vehicle and walked around to the side of his

9

car —

He had been on the stop for probably seven, 10

actually, the passenger side of Deputy Haney's car. I

10

noticed there —

I witnessed Deputy Haney ask Mr. Dunkel to

11

get out of vehicle and he walked him back between the two

12

cars.

13

Q.

14

car then?

15

A.

I did.

16

Q.

What took place then once --

17

A.

Deputy Haney asked him to perform a couple field sobriety

18

tests.

19

Q.

Were you able to -- did you stay back by Deputy Haney's

And you had a chance to observe those tests?
I did.

20
21

Q

Are you a drug recognition expert?

22

A

I'm not so I just watched basically.

23

Q

Where did these tests take place?

24

A

They were in front Deputy Haney's car between two

25

vehicles

21

Q

You were still by the passenger side?

A

I was actually around the front of Deputy Haneyfs car —

Q

At that point?

A

—

Q

After the field sobriety tests, what happened?

A

Deputy Haney asked Mr. Dunkel if he could search his

yeah.

I walked around just to observe what was going,

vehicle.
Q.

And was he allowed to search his vehicle?

A.

He was.

Q.

What took place then once the search —

who did the

search?
A.

Mr. Dunkel —

or Deputy Haney.

Q.

And what did you do?

A.

I just stood back with Mr. Dunkel.

We just stood back at

the -- between the vehicles basically.
Q.

Describe what happened when Deputy Haney got to the

trunk.
A.

He opened the t runk.

Deputy Haneyfs car.

We were» still .standing at the front

He asked Mr. Dunkel what was irt a tub or

a box that was in the back.
friend 1 s.

Mr. Dunkel said it was his

And then Deputy Hailey came ba ck and told

Mr. Dunkel to turn around and placed him in handcuffs and in
custody.
MR. MAYNARD:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Cross?

OOSS-EXHMINATICN

1
2

BY MR. OOGGINS:

3

Q.

Deputy Butler, my name is Devin Coggins, by the way, I

4

represent Mr. Dunkel.
From the time you arrived until Mr. Dunkel was taken into

5
6

custody, do you know how long that was, if you had to

7

estimate?

8

A.

9

Deputy Haney searched the vehicle.

Well, he performed a couple field sobriety tests and then
I would say that was

10

probably maybe 10, 15 minutes if that.

11

Q.

12

vehicle and to give the field sobriety tests?

13

A.

Well, he performed two field sobriety tests and then —

14

Q.

Do you recall —

Okay.

So it only took him 10 to 15 minutes to search the

sorry to interrupt.

Do you recall which tests he performed?

15
16

A.

They were more of a DRE-type tests than your alcohol.

17

They weren't the standard heel-to-toe or anything like that.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

They're ones I haven't been trained in so, obviously, I

20

wouldn't know what to look for.

21

Q.

22

I was just asking how long it took from the time he was given

23

the test until he completed the search of the car and

24

arrested Mr. Dunkel.

25

A.

That's okay.

That's fine.

Go ahead.

I think 10, 15 minutes.

Sorry to interrupt.

I was there —

You were —

looking at my

23

times I was there maybe not even an hour.

I stood by until

the WISK unit the agent from —
Q.

The Strike Force?

A.

—

Q.

Now, you said that you heard Deputy Haney ask Mr. Dunkel

the Strike Force showed up.

what was in the container.
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Do you recall what Mr. Dunkel!s response to that question

was?
A.

He said it was his friend's.

Q.

Okay.

You don't recall him saying anything else

regarding searching that container?
A.

No.

He never told him —

you know, I don't know -- don't

look, he never said anything like that.

He just said, "It's

my friend's."
Q.

Is your —

at the time, was your unit equipped a video

device your car?
A.

My truck, yeah.

Q.

It was?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Did you turn that on when you arrived?

A.

No.

Where I was parked it. wouildn't have picked up Deputy

Haney' s car r I was off to the side. there.
Q.

Was the.re anything prevent.ing you from moving your truck

into a ]posi"tion where you could have videoed the encounter?

1

A.

Actually, when I arrived Deputy Haney was up talking with

2

Mr. Dunkel, I assumed he was finishing the traffic stop

3

because he had been on it so I —

4

to record anything because I thought he was finishing.

5

just walked around to see —

6

was actually done.

7

Q.

8

did you —

9

position where you could have videoed the encounter?

there was no reason for me
So I

you know, stand by, I thought he

Once he began to do field sobriety tests and those things
did it cross your mind to put your truck in a

10

A.

Well, I was out of my vehicle.

11

record other people's traffic stops.

12

stops.

13

Q-

14

though, correct?

15

A.

I —

normally I don't

I record my traffic

If Deputy Haney would have asked you to, you would have

Sure.

16

MR. COGGINS:

One moment.

If I could just have a

17

second.

18

Q.

19

speak with Mr. Dunkel while Deputy Haney was performing the

20

search of the vehicle?

21

A.

22

Deputy Haneyfs car.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

It was just small talk, the weather and that type of

25

stuff.

(BY MR. COGGINS)

Yeah.

Deputy, did you have an opportunity to

We were just standing back there at the bumper of

Did

y° u have any problems understanding him?

1

Q-

2

A.

3

alcohol or anything like that so I didn't believe he was

4

intoxicated or anything like that.

5

know, type thing, but he said he was tired so —

6

Q.

7

A

I could -- he wasn't —

you know, I couldn't smell

He was a little slow, you

Okay.

-

—

I took it at that.

8

Q-

Either way, you didn't put anything in your report that

9

you had any suspicions about any impairment on Mr. Dunkel; is

10

that correct?

11

A.

No, I didn't.

12

MR. COGGINS:

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

All right.

Thank you.

Recross?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MRYNRRD:
Q.
A

-

You're not a drug recognition expert?
I'm

not

•
MR. MAYNARD:

Your Honor, I have no further

questions.
THE COURT:

Officer Butler, what was said between

21

two parties about the question of searching the vehicle?

22

What do you remember Officer Haney saying?

23
24
25

THE WITNESS:

I believe he asked him if he could

look in the vehicle and Mr. Dunkel told him yes.
THE COURT:

I'm sorry?

Zb

And Mr. Dunkel told him —

THE WITNESS:

or said,

yeah, you can look.
THE COURT:

Any discussion about what he was looking

for or why he wanted to search the vehicle?
THE WITNESS :
THE COURT:

I don't recall that.

Okay.

THE WITNESS :

No.

So that's it?
That's

Anything else?

—

Just can I search the vehicle and he

THE COURT:
said yes?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That's what I recall.
All right.

MR. MAYNARD:
THE COURT:

I have nothing.
Any other questions, Mr. Coggins?

MR. COGGINS:
THE COURT:
down.

Anything else?

No, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you.

Officer Butler, you may step

Thank you.

Any other witnesses from the state?
MR. MAYNARD:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
The state rests?

MR. MAYNARD:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Any witnesses from the defense?

MR. COGGINS:
Mr. Dunkel.

Yes, your Honor.

I'd like to call

27

CASPER MICHAEL DUNKEL, III,
having been previously duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EKMMINATICN
BY MR. COGGINS:
Q.

Mr. Dunkel, could you please state your name for the

record.
A.

Yes.

Casper Michael Dunkel, III.

Q.

Now, Mr. Dunkel, first question I have:

Are you under

the influence of any medication today?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you taken any illegal narcotics within the last 48

hours?
A.

No.

Q.

Any prescription medication?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

What have you taken?

A.

Oxycontin and Xanax.

Q.

When was that, yesterday?

A.

Well, I did have Xanax earlier this morning because I'm

having a real hard time sleeping and, you know, nervous over
going to court and stuff.
Q.

And that's prescribed to you from a doctor?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Now, Mr. Dunkel, you recall the incident that

1

we've been talking about here in court today, correct?

2

A.

Yes, I do, very well.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

just —

5

you to get out of the vehicle?

6

A.

No, he did not.

7

Q.

Well, I mean, at some point did he ask you to get out of

8

vehicle?

9

A.

Yes, he did, at one point.

10

Q-

Okay.

11

point?

12

A.

Yes, he did.

13

Q.

What do you recall that he did?

14

A.

Well, I explained my condition that I just had a neck

15

surgery and that I'm getting -- I have to have three discs

16

fused in my back, all right, and plus I've had two broken

17

femurs and I'm not too well towards that.

18

30-second test, giving it to me and how I did it.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Heel-to-toe?

22

A.

Yes, I did.

23

Q.

You walked a line?

24

A.

Yes, I did.

25

Q.

Okay.

Now, I'm going to skip forward a little bit

when Deputy Haney approached your vehicle, did he ask

Now, did he conduct any tests on you at that

I remember the

Do you remember any other tests?
I did do a standing toe-to-toe test.

Now, after you finished the tests, were you placed

zv
under arrest?
A.

No, I was not.

Q.

Were you told that you were going to be placed under

arrest?
A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

And at that point, what happened?

Is that when he asked

you to search the car?
A.

He asked me if he could search inside my car for other

narcotics other than what I had already told him that I have.
Q.

You mean the Xanax you had taken earlier?

A.

I had in my possession at the time Xanax and I wasn't

sure if I had any Oxycontins with me, but I told him those
were the two prescriptions that I am on.
Q.

Okay.

Now, do you recall how long he searched the

interior of your vehicle?
A.

To me it seemed liked it had to have been at least an

hour.

It was long, long, long drawn out like he was looking

for like DNA or something, I mean, he was all through
completely that car everywhere.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

And did he openL the trunks>

A.

Yes, he did •

Q.

Okay.

container?

Now, do you recall if he searched the trunk?

1Slow, do you recall him as ki.ng you about the blue

JU

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

What was your — what did he ask you about the conta iner?

A.

He asked, "What do we have here?"

sure.

And I said, "I'm not

It's a friend of mine's and I can't give you

permission to search it."
Q.

Okay.
MR. COGGINS:
THE COURT:

That's all I have.
Cross?

CIOSS-EXAMINMICN
BY MR. MAXNARD:
Q.

What happens, Mr. Dunkel, if you're convicted of this

offense?
MR. COGGINS

Objection, your Honor, relevance.

MR. MAYNARD

It goes to his motivation or his

cr edibility to —
THE COURT:

I'll allow it.

I guess it goes to bias

as far as his testimony.
THE WITNESS :
Q.

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

Pardon?
What happens if you get convicted of

this offense?
A.

I'm not sure.

Q.

Do you know what degree of offense this is?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q

What is that?
*

A.

First degree felony.
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Q.

And do you know what the possibility penalties are for a

first degree felony?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What are those?

A.

Five to life.

Q.

In fact, if you're convicted of this offense, isn't it

true that you will go back to prison?
MR. COGGINS:

Objection, your Honor, that's beyond

the scope of his ability to answer and I think we've already
established

—

THE COURT:

I think if he knows he can answer.

Maybe he doesn't know.
THE WITNESS:

I haven't the slightest —

no

slightest idea if I will or I won't.
Q.

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

Do you have a guess or do you have a

feeling one way or the other?
MR. COGGINS:

Objection, speculative.

Asking him

for speculation.
THE COURT:
he?
Q.

I think he's already answered it, hasn't

He said he didn't know, so sustained.
(BY MR. MAYNARD)

How long did it seem like the

defendant -- or that the deputy had you stopped and talked to
you before you got out of the car?
A.

Well, he came up and I apologized because I didn't see it

and I explained what happened and towards the signal that was
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there, all right, it was turning —

it went from green to

orange, all right, and there's a signal there and I took it
for granted that there's a signal on 12th Street there that I
am not familiar with.
Q.

Okay.

Mr. Dunkel, my question is:

How long —

once you

had been stopped and the deputy came up to talk to you, how
long was it from that point until you actually got out of the
car?
A.

Say approximately 20 minutes.

Q.

And then you said that it seemed like an hour once the

deputy was inside your car searching?
A.

Yes, when he asked if he could search inside my car.

Q.

How long —

how long did it take once you got out of car

for the deputy to do those field sobriety tests before he
started to search the car?
A

I'd say approximately 15 minutes.

Q

The car that you were in was your car?

A

Yes, it was.

Q

And you're the registered owner?

A

Yes.

Q

And there was no one else in the car?

A

No.
MR. MAYNARD:

I'm drawing a blank.

now I've lost it for a minute.
Honor.

I had a question

Give me just a second, your
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THE COURT:
Q.

Okay.

(BY MR. MAYNARD)

You were placed under arrest after

Deputy Hane>y had looked in the trunk and looked in the
container; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Deputy Haney did ask you i:£ he could look for any other

narcotics in the car?
A.

of my car and I
He asked if he could search the inside <

gave him permission to search 1the inside of my car •
Q.

Do you remember him asking you for regi stration?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember having a conversation with an agent from

the Strike Force after you were arrested?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Okay.
MR. MAYNARD:

Your Honor, I have no further

questions.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. COGGINS:

I don't have any follow-up, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Dunkel, you may step

down,

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Any more testimony?

MR. COGGINS:

I have nothing further, your Honor.

